China is reportedly aiding Bangladesh in reviving an old World War II airbase at Lalmonirhat, just 12-15 kilometres from the Indian border. The airfield, currently controlled by the Bangladesh Air Force but inactive for decades, lies only 135 kilometres from the Siliguri Corridor—India’s crucial ‘Chicken’s Neck’ connecting the northeast to the rest of the country. Chinese officials recently visited the site, signalling Beijing’s growing interest. Although the precise purpose—civilian or military—is unclear, a Chinese presence so close to this narrow passage could increase India’s strategic vulnerability.
Lalmonirhat airbase: A legacy from the past
Originally built by the British in 1931, Lalmonirhat served as a forward base for Allied forces in Southeast Asia during World War II, explains the Kolkata-based Centre for Research in Indo-Bangla Studies. After Partition, Pakistan briefly reopened it in 1958 for civilian use. Since then, it has been largely abandoned, despite its sprawling 1,166 acres and facilities including a four-kilometre runway and large tarmac.
In 2019, Bangladesh’s Sheikh Hasina government announced plans to develop an aviation and aerospace university there, which is now operational under the Bangladesh Air Force. Recently, the interim administration led by Mohammed Yunus proposed reviving Lalmonirhat and five other British-era airports to boost the economy. The other airports include Ishwardi, Thakurgaon, Shamshernagar, Comilla, and Bogra.
Strategic implications for India’s Northeast
The Siliguri Corridor, also known as the ‘Chicken’s Neck,’ is a mere 22 kilometres wide at its narrowest point. It connects India’s eight northeastern states to the mainland. This corridor’s security is vital. “Reports suggest potential Chinese involvement in developing the airbase, possibly as a civilian airport, though fears persist it could serve dual military purposes. This could enable China to monitor Indian military movements or gather intelligence near the [Siliguri] corridor,” says Sriparna Pathak, China Studies professor at OP Jindal Global University, as reported by TOI.
Any disruption to this lifeline could threaten India’s territorial integrity. China’s expanding military presence near the India-Bhutan-China tri-junction has already heightened tensions. The 2017 Doklam standoff exposed the corridor’s vulnerabilities, pushing India to strengthen defences.
The Military-Economic angle
China’s growing footprint in Bangladesh includes not just military interests but economic projects too. Chinese companies are building factories and a solar power plant near Rangpur, and a satellite city is planned. According to a Dhaka-based journalist who spoke anonymously, “These factories are operated almost entirely by Chinese personnel, with minimal involvement from local workers.” Chinese firms are also deeply involved in regional infrastructure and connectivity efforts close to India’s border.
As told to TOI, Kalpit Mankikar, a China-Taiwan Studies fellow at Observer Research Foundation, views the airbase revival as “the natural consequence of two things.” He explains, “One thing is China has definite plans for that region. All this while those plans may have been dormant because [deposed Bangladesh PM] Sheikh Hasina was more accommodative towards India’s interests. Now, with the regime change and Mohammed Yunus’ open offer that Bangladesh can serve as a fountainhead against India, China would definitely be tempted to take up the offer [the airport project].”
Mankikar adds, “We don’t know yet what are China’s plans for the project. But this could be used to monitor civilian and military movement to Northeast from the rest of India and vice versa.”
Pakistan’s shadow looms large
India is also watching Bangladesh’s warmer ties with both China and Pakistan with concern. Before Chinese officials visited Lalmonirhat, a Pakistani military-intelligence delegation inspected some border areas of Bangladesh.
Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi remarked: “I had used the word epicentre of terrorism for a particular country [Pakistan]. Now those countrymen, if they go to any other place and they happen to be our neighbour, as far as I am concerned, I should be concerned about it. That they should not be able to use that soil to send terrorists to India.”
Historically, the Pakistani spy agency, ISI, had close links with armed separatist groups in India’s Northeast, many operating from Bangladesh until a crackdown launched by the Awami League government in 2009.
China’s expanding air power along the Himalayan Frontier
This airbase development ties into a broader pattern of Chinese military expansion. As reported by NDTV, since 2024, China has upgraded six new airbases near the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with improved aprons, engine test pads, and support infrastructure. Bases in Tingri, Lhunze, Burang, Yutian, and Yarkant have all seen significant improvements, with drones also spotted on the tarmac.
As told to NDTV, Damien Symon, geospatial intelligence researcher, said, “These near-simultaneous infrastructure enhancements across multiple Chinese airbases along the Line of Actual Control suggest a deliberate strategy to increase operational reach and readiness in border-adjacent zones.”
Former Indian Air Force (IAF) Vice Chief Air Marshal Anil Khosla (retired) highlights the threat: “Airbases like Tingri, Lhunze, and Burang are located close to the Line of Actual Control (LAC), within 25-150 km. This proximity allows for the quick deployment of PLA Air Force (PLAAF) assets to forward positions and shorter response times in case of a border escalation.” He adds, “These bases offer greater depth, logistics, and density. The PLAAF can now deploy fighter squadrons and drones rapidly into forward bases.”
China is also overcoming altitude challenges in Tibet by investing in more powerful engines and advanced technologies such as drones, airborne early warning aircraft, and air-to-air refuelling. “China’s concept of ‘airbase clusters’ means that even if one is targeted, others nearby can support operations, enhancing tactical flexibility, survivability, and redundancy,” says Khosla.
India’s response and the emerging balance of power
The Indian Air Force has upgraded several bases, including Ambala and Hasimara, enhancing infrastructure, radar systems, and cybersecurity. But China’s rapid induction of new-generation fighters, including around 195 fifth-generation J-20 stealth fighters, puts it at a qualitative advantage. India has yet to roll out its own stealth aircraft.
In December 2024, China revealed two new stealth fighters, dubbed J-36 and J-50 by Western analysts, designed for AI-supported operations alongside drones. “With new airbases meant to support such platforms, China may be signalling intent beyond temporary or contingency utility for the Chinese Air Force,” says Symon. “The scale and depth indicate preparations for sustained deployments, rapid mobility and persistent presence near the LAC.”
The revival of Lalmonirhat airbase near India’s vulnerable ‘Chicken’s Neck’ corridor fits into this larger strategic picture — underscoring the complex military and geopolitical challenges facing India in the region.
Lalmonirhat airbase: A legacy from the past
Originally built by the British in 1931, Lalmonirhat served as a forward base for Allied forces in Southeast Asia during World War II, explains the Kolkata-based Centre for Research in Indo-Bangla Studies. After Partition, Pakistan briefly reopened it in 1958 for civilian use. Since then, it has been largely abandoned, despite its sprawling 1,166 acres and facilities including a four-kilometre runway and large tarmac.
In 2019, Bangladesh’s Sheikh Hasina government announced plans to develop an aviation and aerospace university there, which is now operational under the Bangladesh Air Force. Recently, the interim administration led by Mohammed Yunus proposed reviving Lalmonirhat and five other British-era airports to boost the economy. The other airports include Ishwardi, Thakurgaon, Shamshernagar, Comilla, and Bogra.
Strategic implications for India’s Northeast
The Siliguri Corridor, also known as the ‘Chicken’s Neck,’ is a mere 22 kilometres wide at its narrowest point. It connects India’s eight northeastern states to the mainland. This corridor’s security is vital. “Reports suggest potential Chinese involvement in developing the airbase, possibly as a civilian airport, though fears persist it could serve dual military purposes. This could enable China to monitor Indian military movements or gather intelligence near the [Siliguri] corridor,” says Sriparna Pathak, China Studies professor at OP Jindal Global University, as reported by TOI.
Any disruption to this lifeline could threaten India’s territorial integrity. China’s expanding military presence near the India-Bhutan-China tri-junction has already heightened tensions. The 2017 Doklam standoff exposed the corridor’s vulnerabilities, pushing India to strengthen defences.
The Military-Economic angle
China’s growing footprint in Bangladesh includes not just military interests but economic projects too. Chinese companies are building factories and a solar power plant near Rangpur, and a satellite city is planned. According to a Dhaka-based journalist who spoke anonymously, “These factories are operated almost entirely by Chinese personnel, with minimal involvement from local workers.” Chinese firms are also deeply involved in regional infrastructure and connectivity efforts close to India’s border.
As told to TOI, Kalpit Mankikar, a China-Taiwan Studies fellow at Observer Research Foundation, views the airbase revival as “the natural consequence of two things.” He explains, “One thing is China has definite plans for that region. All this while those plans may have been dormant because [deposed Bangladesh PM] Sheikh Hasina was more accommodative towards India’s interests. Now, with the regime change and Mohammed Yunus’ open offer that Bangladesh can serve as a fountainhead against India, China would definitely be tempted to take up the offer [the airport project].”
Mankikar adds, “We don’t know yet what are China’s plans for the project. But this could be used to monitor civilian and military movement to Northeast from the rest of India and vice versa.”
Pakistan’s shadow looms large
India is also watching Bangladesh’s warmer ties with both China and Pakistan with concern. Before Chinese officials visited Lalmonirhat, a Pakistani military-intelligence delegation inspected some border areas of Bangladesh.
Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi remarked: “I had used the word epicentre of terrorism for a particular country [Pakistan]. Now those countrymen, if they go to any other place and they happen to be our neighbour, as far as I am concerned, I should be concerned about it. That they should not be able to use that soil to send terrorists to India.”
Historically, the Pakistani spy agency, ISI, had close links with armed separatist groups in India’s Northeast, many operating from Bangladesh until a crackdown launched by the Awami League government in 2009.
China’s expanding air power along the Himalayan Frontier
This airbase development ties into a broader pattern of Chinese military expansion. As reported by NDTV, since 2024, China has upgraded six new airbases near the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with improved aprons, engine test pads, and support infrastructure. Bases in Tingri, Lhunze, Burang, Yutian, and Yarkant have all seen significant improvements, with drones also spotted on the tarmac.
As told to NDTV, Damien Symon, geospatial intelligence researcher, said, “These near-simultaneous infrastructure enhancements across multiple Chinese airbases along the Line of Actual Control suggest a deliberate strategy to increase operational reach and readiness in border-adjacent zones.”
Former Indian Air Force (IAF) Vice Chief Air Marshal Anil Khosla (retired) highlights the threat: “Airbases like Tingri, Lhunze, and Burang are located close to the Line of Actual Control (LAC), within 25-150 km. This proximity allows for the quick deployment of PLA Air Force (PLAAF) assets to forward positions and shorter response times in case of a border escalation.” He adds, “These bases offer greater depth, logistics, and density. The PLAAF can now deploy fighter squadrons and drones rapidly into forward bases.”
China is also overcoming altitude challenges in Tibet by investing in more powerful engines and advanced technologies such as drones, airborne early warning aircraft, and air-to-air refuelling. “China’s concept of ‘airbase clusters’ means that even if one is targeted, others nearby can support operations, enhancing tactical flexibility, survivability, and redundancy,” says Khosla.
India’s response and the emerging balance of power
The Indian Air Force has upgraded several bases, including Ambala and Hasimara, enhancing infrastructure, radar systems, and cybersecurity. But China’s rapid induction of new-generation fighters, including around 195 fifth-generation J-20 stealth fighters, puts it at a qualitative advantage. India has yet to roll out its own stealth aircraft.
In December 2024, China revealed two new stealth fighters, dubbed J-36 and J-50 by Western analysts, designed for AI-supported operations alongside drones. “With new airbases meant to support such platforms, China may be signalling intent beyond temporary or contingency utility for the Chinese Air Force,” says Symon. “The scale and depth indicate preparations for sustained deployments, rapid mobility and persistent presence near the LAC.”
The revival of Lalmonirhat airbase near India’s vulnerable ‘Chicken’s Neck’ corridor fits into this larger strategic picture — underscoring the complex military and geopolitical challenges facing India in the region.
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